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Abstract: Seven of the eight EU countries not yet using the euro as their legal tender undertook to 
adopt the common currency in the future. However, the actual moment of adoption may influence, 
e.g. the attitude of the population (households). Other needs for the use of the euro have a business 
sector that is managed considering current market conditions and opportunities. The prerequisite of 
this article is that within the non-EMU EU economies, due to the close ties to EMU members and 
the prospect of a future, albeit often uncertain, approach to the euro area, the gradual euroization 
of businesses takes place. Among other things, euroization should be reflected in foreign trade, 
namely in the currency of invoicing. Using the Eurostat data from 2010–2018 on import and export 
and the currency of non-EMU countries invoicing to third countries expressed in EUR, USD, national 
and other currencies, the links between invoicing currency, size of economies and exchange rate 
regime were sought. The aim was also to describe the actual trend of invoicing international trade to 
third countries outside the EU. According to the results of the analysis, it was found that the block of 
non-EMU countries rather euroizes and the importance of the national currency is rather declining. 
The level of growth of the share of the euro and the decline of the national currency has a different 
intensity for imports and different for exports. At the same time, it was found that in the case of 
imports in EUR and NC and exports in EUR, a possible relationship between the invoicing currency 
and the exchange rate regime can be identified. Last but not least, it was found that in the case of 
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Introduction
Once entering the European Union, the Czech 
Republic as well as at present six other countries 
which are not currently members of the EMU 
committed to accept common currency – the 
euro. For example, Sweden accessed in 1995, 
the Czech Republic in 2004 and these two 
countries are still using their national currencies. 
By coincidence, these two countries use 
for payments their crowns – Czech koruna, 
respectively Swedish kronor. What is more, 
in case of these two countries, a date of EMU 
accession has not been set yet. In fact, due to 
several major unfortunately rather negative, 
economic events that have taken place over the 
last decade (i.e. financial crisis, debt crisis), and 
due to several ongoing economic problems of 
the Eurozone (e.g. significant public debt burden 
for Greece or Italy; the budgetary problems of 
Italy and, to some extent, France; responsibility 
for indebtedness of national economies, etc), the 
relevant EU institutions do not even put pressure 
on countries still using their national currencies 
in order to fulfil the commitment of euro adoption.
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Certain deficiencies in the functioning of the 
euro area as such (see, e.g., De Grauwe, 2016; 
or Dosi et al., 2019) as well as public opinion on 
the euro in particular countries seem to deter the 
pressure on these national economies to adopt 
the euro. The European Commission via its 
initiative – Eurobarometer – regularly monitors 
support for the euro adoption and perceptions 
of single currency benefits in countries still 
using their national currency as a legal tender 
(hereinafter referred non-EMU members). The 
percentage support rate of the euro adoption in 
non-EU member states within the years 2012–
2019 is presented in Tab. 1 below.
There is missing Denmark in Tab. 1 that 
has a permanent opt-out, which means that 
Denmark has no obligation to adopt the euro. 
Thus, monitoring Danish attitude towards the 
euro is quite irrelevant. At the same time, Tab. 
1 does not contain Great Britain which left the 
EU on February 1, 2020. It means, there are 
currently 8 non-euro countries in the EU. These 
8 countries represent a market comprising 
approximately 105 million inhabitants with 
an economic output of EUR 1,910.9 billion 
(according to Eurostat; year 2018), which is 
about 23% of the EU population with a share of 
about 14% of GDP.
Tab. 1 shows that the country with the 
lowest support for the introduction of the 
euro in its territory is Sweden (36% in 2019; 
minimum of 30% in 2016) closely followed by 
the Czech Republic (39% in 2019; minimum 
of 12% in 2012). On the other hand, there 
are two countries in which the support of the 
euro introduction exceeds 60%. In particular, 
support in Romania amounted to 61% in 2019 
(cf. maximum of 74% in 2014) and support in 
Hungary reached 66% in 2019 (cf. minimum 
of 54% in 2013). However, as regards the 
trends in these two euro-inclined countries, in 
Romania the trend is rather downward, while 
in Hungary it is increasing. It is certainly worth 
mentioning Sweden, which has been a member 
of the EU since 1995, i.e. the longest of all listed 
in the table. Sweden does not apply permanent 
opt-out as Denmark does. However, Swedes 
refused euro adoption in the referendum in 
2003 when 56% of voters voted against the 
euro.
Regarding the observable trends, Tab. 1 
shows that Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania 
Country/year 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 5Y Trend (slope)
Bulgaria 53 52 51 55 47 50 51 47 slightly decreasing (−1.2)
Croatia* – – 55 53 48 52 47 49 slightly decreasing (−0.9)
Czech Republic 12 13 15 29 29 29 33 39 growing (+2.4)
Hungary 58 54 64 60 57 57 59 66 growing (+1.4)
Poland 44 38 45 44 41 43 48 46 slightly growing (+1.1)




Sweden NA NA NA 32 30 35 40 36 growing (+1.8)
Non-EMU total 47 45 52 49 45 47 51 49 slightly growing (+0.6)
Source: Mačí (2019, p. 214), edited.
Notes: The figures are a sum of the answers ‘very much in favor’ and ‘rather in favor’ of introducing the euro. Data were 
collected for the fourth month of the year.
*Croatia is a member state of the EU since 07/2013 thus opinion polls for 2012 and 2013 are not available.
Tab. 1: Opinion polls in member states yet to adopt the euro (support for euro in %)
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experienced drop in support between initial 
and end observation (Bulgaria and Croatia −6 
percentage points, Romania −3 p.p.; at the 
same length of observation – i.e. from 2014 
to 2019 – the values would slightly change to 
−4 p.p. in case of Bulgaria and −13 p.p. for 
Romania). On the contrary, the most significant 
increase is observable in case of the Czech 
Republic (+27 p.p.).
Various opinion polls show – at least on 
the example of the Czech Republic – a slight 
difference in opinion on the euro adoption 
between different parts of society, such as 
between households and companies and more 
pronounced differences among businesses as 
such (see, e.g., Knížková, 2018). The opinion 
of the population of the EU countries as 
a whole not yet using the euro is represented 
by Tab. 1. Regarding the business sector, the 
attitudes towards the euro differ. Particularly 
those companies that export to EMU countries, 
respectively companies that invoice their 
exports/imports in euros would probably like 
to replace the national currency (NC) with 
a common currency. It can also be assumed 
that companies incorporated in multinational 
chains (MNC) and concerns, and other 
enterprises with a significant share of foreign 
ownership, or national enterprises that do not 
have the power to assert their national currency 
as invoicing one, would also welcome the 
introduction of the euro as a legal tender. Such 
enterprises may subsequently have an effect on 
a certain ‘spontaneous’ euroization of the whole 
economy. The term ‘spontaneous euroization’ 
has been already used by authors Horníková 
et al. (2005). In their article, they present data 
obtained by the Czech National Bank (CNB) 
from the early phase of the physical existence 
of the euro, i.e. from the years 2001–2003. 
These data and authors’ comments practically 
confirm the above-stated theses, albeit on 
a different timeline.
The situation regarding the potential growth 
in the number of euro area members, to say the 
final euroization of an economy, now appears 
as follows. The candidate states enter or plan to 
enter the Eurozone individually, not in blocks. At 
the same time, these states have theoretically 
the possibility of postponing their entry until 
they consider themselves ready. This provides 
a unique opportunity to study a wide range of 
elements and circumstances related to the 
creation of an optimal currency area.
This article seeks to fill a research gap in 
the field of international trade and its invoicing 
when exporting/importing businesses come 
from an EU Member State that is not a member 
of the EMU. At the same time, the research 
will suitably complement the ex-ante view of 
the optimum currency areas, which assumes 
that the introduction of the single currency 
will ex-post strengthen international trade. So, 
in such a situation, is there an euroization of 
international trade ex-ante? If the answer is 
yes, then such a finding can be useful for both 
the private and public sectors. For example, the 
issue of exchange rate hedging may be crucial 
for the private sector both for non-financial 
corporations seeking exchange rate hedging 
and for financial corporations offering exchange 
rate hedging. The public sector, in turn, can 
better specify and present its position and 
policy towards the common currency.
Based on the above stated the research 
aim of this article is to find out whether, or with 
what trend and under what circumstances 
participation in the economic union with the 
potential to participate in monetary union entails 
changes in the invoicing of international trade.
In order to reach the goal, this article 
continues as follows. First, based on the 
literature review, the euroization and its 
manifestations in the field of international trade 
on the example of invoicing are described. 
Subsequently, the research methodology is 
presented, including the presentation of the 
analyzed data. The following chapter contains 
the research results, discussion of the results 
and finally the conclusion.
1. Euroization
If there exists or occurs a large economic 
area with a single currency of a high quality 
and economic subjects from such area are 
active in cross-border economic activities then 
such a currency naturally gains influence and 
asserts itself in international transactions. For 
pushing one currency at the expense of the 
other, the theory knows terms as dollarization, 
euroization, etc. This article, given its focus, 
works with the term ‘euroization’.
As Horníková et al. (2005) state, euroization 
can take two forms – official or spontaneous. 
The official euroization means that a country will 
become a full member of the countries using the 
common currency (i.e. joining the euro area). 
Unofficial or spontaneous, alternatively natural 
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euroization consists in replacing the domestic 
currency with a foreign currency (the euro) of the 
pure will of firms and households. An extreme 
case of spontaneous euroization is the situation 
where the whole state moves unilaterally to 
use foreign currency. Such a country does not 
participate in operations of the central bank 
managing the replacing currency, because the 
country is not a member of the official structures 
(Montenegro is a current example in Europe). 
Mainly due to the loss of monetary instruments, 
including the function of the central bank as 
a lender of last resort, as well as the uncertain 
benefits of long-term euroization, for example 
Rochon and Rossi (2003) warn against the 
unilateral adoption of the euro (or US dollar).
Scientific articles and publications deal 
with the topic of euroization or dollarization at 
various levels, be it at the banking sector (e.g. 
Xhelili, 2016; Bošnjak, 2018), non-financial 
corporations, households (Beckmann, 2015) or 
the economies as a whole (see, e.g., Horníková 
et al., 2005; Ivanov et al., 2011; Udoh & Udeaja, 
2019). The impact of the introduction of the 
single currency on trade is often monitored 
(see below, e.g., Rose, 2000; Bun & Klaasen, 
2007; Mika & Zymek, 2018). Almost all similarly 
focused contributions have an overlap with the 
topic of optimal or at least common currency 
areas.
From the perspective of the optimum 
currency area theory, it should be possible 
to observe whether the so-called ‘coronation 
theory’ is being fulfilled in EU Member States 
that do not yet have the euro as their official 
currency. Thus, whether such economies are 
converging in such a way that, due to their 
very close and intense economic-political links 
with euro area members, they should be able 
to switch to a common currency with minimal 
economic costs and minimal risk of so-called 
asymmetric shocks; in other words, the benefits 
of membership should outweigh the costs.
Vice versa, from the perspective of 
alternate theory to the coronation, i.e. so-
called ‘train theory’, it should be observable 
on the example of newcomers to the euro 
area whether this theory is being fulfilled, for 
example, by the increased intensity of trade 
between them, which in turn should mean 
a reduced risk of asymmetric shocks. About 
the relationship between trade exchange and 
the risk of asymmetric shocks, see, e.g., De 
Grauwe (2018). As for the link between the 
common currency and trade exchange, for 
example, Rose (2000) on the data he analyzed 
using the gravity model concludes that the 
common currency promotes international trade 
very significantly. On the other hand, Bun and 
Klaasen (2007), who take as their starting 
point researches mentioning the benefits of the 
single currency to international trade in terms 
of growth of 5% to 40%, achieve only about 3% 
benefit after model revision. Similarly, Mika and 
Zymek (2018) do not observe that accession to 
the EMU would result in a significant boost in 
international trade.
2. EU Countries Still Using  
Their National Currencies  
and the Eurozone – Intra  
and Extra-EU Trade
The Czech Republic, Sweden, Denmark, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, and 
Croatia are EU members, however, from the 
point of view of integration stages, integration 
within the economic and monetary union has 
not been completed. I.e., these countries are 
still using their national currency (NC) as their 
legal tender. Until recently, the United Kingdom 
was a separate case. The UK not only had never 
been a member of the euro area; this country 
even had a negotiated opt-out from adopting 
the euro. And above all, the UK completely left 
the EU in February 2020. At the same time, it is 
appropriate to clarify the position of Denmark, 
Bulgaria and Croatia.
On the one hand, Denmark is not the 
member of the Eurozone. On the other hand, 
Denmark operates in ERM II currency regime 
with the oscillation band ±2.5%, which is much 
narrower than ±15% fluctuation band that ERM 
II allows (The IMF ranks Denmark among the 
group of countries using the currency regime 
conventional peg). Croatia does not participate 
in ERM II, however, the exchange rate of local 
kuna has been kept stable (according to the 
IMF classification, it falls into the so-called 
stabilized arrangement; in fulfilling its primary 
objective of price stability, the Croatian central 
bank itself emphasizes the issue of the stability 
of the Croatian kuna against the euro, given 
the openness of the Croatian economy and 
the significant exposure of trade to the euro 
area (Croatian National Bank, 2015)). As well 
as Croatia, even Bulgaria does not participate 
in ERM II. However, Bulgaria has a rate firmly 
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tied to the euro in the currency board regime. 
The rest of the non-EMU countries do not 
practice fixed regimes. In fact, they operate with 
managed floating (CZ, HU, RO), or free floating 
(SE, PL) (IMF, 2019, pp. 6–7).
From the above implies, that regarding 
euroization, there is a relatively large block of 
countries within the EU that still use the national 
currency but at the same time these countries 
have a rich trade exchange with EU countries 
that have renounced their national currencies in 
favor of the euro. There also exists a subgroup 
of countries within the non-EMU members (DK, 
HR, BG) that, which given its exchange rate 
regime, is essentially a ‘hidden user of the euro 
area’.
It is therefore possible to ask what the 
euro’s success is in terms of export/import 
between EU countries and third countries (so-
called extra-EU trade), or in the case of trade 
between a non-euro area member and a euro 
area member within the EU (in fact a specific 
type of intra-EU trade) – see the following 
chapter.
2.1 Invoicing in the Euro
Why is a choice in which currency to invoice 
important? It is one of the possible ways of 
exchange rate hedging in the form of so-called 
natural hedging. For more on the choice of 
invoicing currency due to various variables (e.g. 
industry), see, for example, Ito et al. (2016) 
who focused on Japan, or Goldberg and Tille 
(2008) who analyzed driving forces for currency 
invoicing on the sample of 24 countries. Ligthart 
and Werner (2012) deal with the economic 
space that is close to the focus of this article. 
These authors observed the growing share of 
the euro as an invoicing currency in the case 
of Norway (not only a non-euro area member, 
but even a non-EU member). Ligthart and 
Werner (2012) add that in the Norwegian case, 
the euro is gradually gaining ground not only at 
the expense of the Norwegian crown, but also 
adopts the position of ‘vehicle currency’ from 
the US dollar.
On the other hand, in the case of EU, 
invoicing in euros between two EU members 
whether or not they are part of the EMU 
Fig. 1: Extra-EU trade in 2010–2018 – shares on imports (upper part) and exports (lower part) by invoicing currency (%)
Source: own based on Eurostat Database
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seems quite natural (the exception might be, 
respectively might have been the Great Britain 
thanks to the volume of its economy and 
traditionally strong position of the British pound 
with the potential to push through GBP as an 
invoicing currency; Brexit could also have an 
additional effect).
As regards the invoicing of exports from/
imports to the EU of countries outside the EU, 
the US dollar (USD) is a major competitor in 
terms of the invoicing currency. According to 
Eurostat data (2019) for 2018, for all EU Member 
States, the US dollar even predominates in EU 
imports (56% for USD vs. 35% for EUR). See 
the upper part of Fig. 1. Moreover, as Eurostat 
(2019) states, USD is practically a hegemon in 
terms of oil invoicing (the share was 88% for the 
year 2018). In the case of EU exports, on the 
other hand, the euro is the most widely used 
currency with a 48% share; USD share is 35%. 
The national currencies of non-EMU members 
account for 5% and the other currencies 4% 
(Fig. 1, lower part). On the other hand, it may 
be worth mentioning that even in the case 
of imports, the euro would have a higher 
percentage, if the oil is excluded (Eurostat, 
2019).
Regarding EU-wide trends, Fig. 1 observe 
the virtually stable position of all currencies on 
import invoicing. There is a slightly different 
situation in exports. The euro with the dollar 
in total holds a stable 83% share, but the euro 
slightly lost in favor of the US dollar (EUR 2018–
2010 −3.7 p.p.; USD 2018–2010 +3.1 p.p.)
2.2 Determination of Hypotheses
The following part of the paper will, in line with 
the objective, fully focus on invoicing of non-
EMU countries. In view of the UK’s possibility 
to promote its national currency as an invoicing 
one as it was outlined above, the following 
hypothesis is established:
H1: The percentage share of the currency 
in export/import invoicing does not depend on 
the amount of GDP output measured by EUR.
In the case of H1, the question of whether the 
size of the economy affects the determination of 
the invoicing currency is examined. Variations 
for EUR, USD a NC (national currencies of non-
EMU states) are monitored. The assumptions 
are:
 The larger the economy (measured by 
GDP), the greater the percentage of the 
national currency in export/import invoicing.
 The smaller the economy, the greater the 
share of the euro as an invoicing currency.
 The smaller the economy, the greater the 
share of the dollar as an invoicing currency.
At the same time, with regard to the above 
presented exchange rate regimes of individual 
non-EMU economies, a second hypothesis is 
set:
H2: The percentage share of invoicing 
currency does not depend on the exchange 
rate regime.
In H2, it is checked whether the method of 
determining the NC rate to EUR has an impact 
on the invoicing currency. It is now assumed 
that:
 The more the exchange rate is set by the 
market (min = currency board; max = free 
floating), the smaller the share of EUR or 
USD.
 The more the exchange rate is set by 
the market (min = currency board; max = 
free floating), the greater the share of the 
national currency.
Last but not least, basically a certain 
influence of time is examined, when here 
presented research suggests that the long-
term participation of non-EMU countries in the 
economic union leads to a naturally increasing 
use of the euro and a decline in the share of the 
national currency. Thus, the following research 
question is defined:
RQ1: Has the average share of the euro as 
the invoicing currency of non-EMU countries 
a growing trend?
3. Data and Methodology
For the purposes of partial analyzes, the data 
on the size of GDP and on the share of invoicing 
currencies in imports/exports presented by 
Eurostat were used. Due to missing data in 
terms of invoicing currency on intra-EU trade 
of non-EMU EU members (these data are 
not monitored within Intrastat; amounts are 
reported in national currency for non-EMU 
countries), data related to extra-EU trade for 
2010–2018 were analyzed; monitored at two-
year intervals (see Tab. 2).
While this data cannot provide 
a comprehensive view of the euroization of trade 
in EU Member States not yet using the euro (in 
non-EMU countries), at least partial trends can 
be identified and possible differences and other 
characteristics in potential euroization of the 
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2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports
Bulgaria
EUR 26.4 43.2 23.9 36.7 29.7 41.7 36.4 45.8 36.7 46.7
USD 71.9 54.5 65.0 60.6 68.4 54.7 60.5 51.7 61.6 51.3
EU national 
currencies 0.7 0.7 1.6 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.7 0.5 0.4 0.6
Other 1.1 1.7 9.4 2.1 1.0 2.5 1.4 1.9 1.3 1.5
Czechia
EUR 23.7 50.5 26.5 50.5 31.1 49.5 32.7 49.3 27.2 49.7
USD 67.7 34.2 67.3 33.5 63.2 34.3 51.2 36.2 52.9 34.7
EU national 
currencies 3.9 4.1 2.3 3.3 2.0 3.1 11.5 3.0 15.8 2.9
Other 4.7 11.3 3.8 12.8 3.7 13.1 4.6 11.5 4.2 12.7
Croatia
EUR NA NA NA NA 38.3 73.7 49.1 66.6 53.1 70.2
USD NA NA NA NA 58.0 12.9 48.6 21.9 44.8 19.7
EU national 
currencies NA NA NA NA 2.4 11.4 1.3 8.4 1.0 7.1
other NA NA NA NA 1.3 2.1 1.0 3.1 1.1 3.1
Denmark
EUR 24.0 22.8 22.1 22.3 21.4 22.7 23.8 21.1 22.8 22.9
USD 51.4 29.6 58.0 33.7 51.1 33.2 46.5 33.6 45.9 32.4
EU national 
currencies 12.3 19.2 11.6 18.3 12.7 16.4 14.8 16.5 13.9 16.3
Other 12.3 28.3 8.3 25.8 14.8 27.6 14.9 28.8 17.4 28.4
Hungary
EUR 29.5 48.6 22.7 44.4 26.5 50.0 32.5 52.0 40.0 54.5
USD 63.4 40.6 70.7 37.2 67.2 30.7 59.9 28.6 51.7 27.0
EU national 
currencies 3.4 1.8 4.4 9.1 4.5 10.3 4.8 10.2 5.7 7.7
Other 3.6 9.1 2.2 9.3 1.8 8.9 2.8 9.1 2.6 10.7
Poland
EUR 20.0 57.4 18.4 59.0 21.6 57.4 27.3 55.8 26.9 55.0
USD 67.0 29.4 68.6 28.0 67.2 27.8 60.8 27.7 62.2 27.9
EU national 
currencies 10.7 7.8 11.5 7.3 9.4 7.8 8.9 7.8 7.8 7.5
other 2.3 5.3 1.6 5.7 1.9 7.1 3.0 8.7 3.1 9.6
Romania
EUR 35.2 52.1 37.2 52.0 34.2 51.4 43.5 56.6 43.3 56.5
USD 59.5 41.4 57.2 40.6 60.7 39.3 51.3 33.7 52.5 34.7
EU national 
currencies 3.2 0.5 3.7 0.8 3.3 1.1 3.4 2.3 2.0 1.7
Other 2.0 6.0 2.0 6.6 1.8 8.1 1.8 7.4 2.1 7.0
Sweden
EUR 10.4 23.9 17.3 23.3 20.3 20.5 14.2 16.8 12.7 19.9
USD 39.7 11.8 58.1 27.7 54.4 35.0 48.8 37.9 53.2 34.5
EU national 
currencies 31.7 47.6 16.0 30.0 16.1 21.6 15.7 21.1 14.2 18.8
Other 18.2 16.7 8.6 19.0 9.2 22.9 21.3 24.2 19.9 26.8
Tab. 2: Shares by invoicing currency – Extra-EU trade by non-EMU member state (in %) – Part 1
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monitored economies – or this notional block of 
economies as a whole – can be identified.
As far as the methods of work are concerned, 
regression analysis is used to test the 
hypothesis H1. Within this framework, there is 
always sought a possible statistically significant 
model, which most accurately describes the 
possible dependence between the explanatory 
and the explained variable (GDP vs. a share of 
invoicing currency for 2018).
In the case of the hypothesis H2, the 
relationship between the ordinal and the 
numerical variable (the degree of exchange 
rate determination by a market and the share 
of the invoicing currency) is analyzed. Thus, 
the Pearson correlation coefficient is employed. 
The determination of the degree of exchange 
rate flexibility is based on the IMF Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions 2018 (IMF, 2019). Thus, 
in the framework of this analysis is worked with 
currency board (Bulgaria), conventional peg 
(i.e. ERM II; Denmark), stabilized arrangement 
(Croatia), floating (the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Romania), and free floating 
(Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). 
Numbers from 1 to 5 are assigned to each type 
of exchange rate arrangements.
Finally, in the case of RQ1, when the 
years 2010–2018 are compared (all 9 non-
EMU countries, or 8 countries for 2010 and 
2012, when Croatia was not yet a member of 
the EU), the trajectory of the euro and national 
currencies is evaluated using averages.
4. Research Results
As far as the research results are concerned, 
they are presented in the order in which the 
research hypotheses were presented. That is, 
the relationship between the size of the economy 
(independent variable) and the percentage 
share of the invoicing currency (dependent 
variable) was analyzed first. Subsequently, the 
results concerning the relationship between the 
exchange rate determination and the share of 
the invoicing currency are presented. Finally, 
the results of analysis of the development of 
averages over time are presented.
4.1 Invoicing Currency and GDP
For the presentation of H1 testing results, the 
graphical design was chosen (see Fig. 2). The 
analysis shows that the size of the economy 
has an impact on invoicing in EUR and national 
currencies (NC). Respectively, the hypothesis 
H1 on the independence between the size of 
GDP and the share of invoicing in EUR or NC 
was rejected at α = 5% (for the effect of GB on 
the analysis results, see the text below).
In the case of invoicing in EUR, both imports 
and exports show an indirect relationship 
between the invoicing currency and the size of 
GDP. I.e. the larger the GDP, the smaller the 
share of the euro as the invoicing currency. 
Both in the case of import and export, the 
most appropriate model is the exponential 
relationship (p-value = 0.001 resp. 0.000). 





2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports
United 
Kingdom
EUR 5.2 3.6 4.1 3.5 5.2 3.3 4.6 3.2 5.4 3.6
USD 65.3 31.4 67.2 33.8 66.4 35.9 67.5 35.6 66.3 44.7
EU national 
currencies 25.2 61.4 20.5 59.6 23.2 57.1 20.6 57.4 21.9 43.9
Other 4.3 3.6 8.2 3.1 5.2 3.7 7.2 3.8 6.5 7.7
Non-EMU 
average
EUR 21.8 37.8 21.5 36.5 25.4 41.1 29.3 40.8 29.8 42.1
USD 60.7 34.1 64.0 36.9 61.8 33.8 55.0 34.1 54.6 34.1
EU national 
currencies 11.4 17.9 9.0 16.1 8.3 14.4 9.2 14.1 9.2 11.8
Other 6.1 10.3 5.5 10.6 4.5 10.7 6.4 10.9 6.5 11.9
Source: own based on Eurostat (2019)
Tab. 2: Shares by invoicing currency – Extra-EU trade by non-EMU member state (in %) – Part 2
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Fig. 2: Share on imports/exports by invoicing currency in relation to GDP (year 2018)  – Part 1
Source: own
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for exports even 85% of the variability of the 
dependent variable.
As for invoicing in NC, here is the relationship 
actually inverse to invoicing in EUR. I.e. NC’s 
share in invoicing increases both in import 
and export as GDP grows (see Fig. 2). The 
relationship between NC’s share of the invoicing 
currency and GDP is well represented by the 
logarithmic function. For imports, the model 
describes 70%, and for exports 67.6% variability 
of the dependent variable (p-value = 0.005, 
resp. 0.007). Thus, the accuracy of NC models 
is lower, but still significant, compared to the 
EUR situation. In addition, in the case of exports 
invoiced in NC, a straight line would even better 
capture the relationship with GDP (p-value 
= 0.000 and R2 = 0.861). Poland’s position 
can be noticed from the graphs or residual 
calculations for EUR and NC. As the second 
largest economy of the sample, Poland does not 
fit into theoretical models. The theoretical share 
of the euro in invoicing should be considerably 
lower in relation to the output of the economy, 
while the share of the national currency (Polish 
zloty – PLZ) should be significantly higher. This 
situation points to the weak position of the Polish 
zloty as an invoicing currency when exporting to 
countries outside the EU. The share of PLZ in 
imports even steadily decreases in 2010–2018 
(−2.9 p.p.), while the share of EUR increases 
(+6.9 p.p.). In the case of exports, the situation 
is not that clear (PLZ −0.3 p.p.; EUR −2.4 p.p.) 
– here, the decline in both currencies is offset 
by an increase in the ratio of invoicing in other 
currencies (+4.3 p.p.).
Finally, as far as invoicing in US dollar and 
GDP are concerned, the null hypothesis of 
independence between the explanatory and the 
explained variable cannot be rejected at the 5% 
significance level. In this case, the dependence 
has not been proven.
Last but not least, to the influence of GB 
on the results of H1 hypothesis testing. In 
general, it is not very appropriate to include 
a single point in the analysis that is far from 
other observations. After examining the results 
of tests without GB, it was found that the results 
differ mainly for exports in EUR and NC, when 
the above-mentioned dependence cannot be 
observed. For imports invoiced in EUR or NC, 
Fig. 2: Share on imports/exports by invoicing currency in relation to GDP (year 2018) – Part 2
Source: own
EM_4_2020.indd   191 18.11.2020   12:28:31
192 2020, XXIII, 4
Finance
the situation mainly changes in model accuracy. 
R2 for exponential (invoicing in EUR) drops to 
0.624. R2 for the logarithmic function drops 
to 0.511. After the omission of Great Britain, 
a large influence on the (in)accuracy of the 
models is caused mainly due to Poland, which 
does not behave as expected (see Fig. 2).
4.2 Invoicing Currency and the 
Exchange Rate Arrangement
In finding the correlation between these two 
variables, it is obviously not possible to say 
that one variable is dependent and the other 
independent. It can be probably argued that if 
the exchange rate is fixed in a foreign currency, 
it is indifferent for businesses to choose which 
currency to choose as the invoicing currency – 
this is what Denmark appears to be. Similarly, it 
may be argued that a high exposure to foreign 
currency requires as much as possible to fix the 
exchange rate, or to minimize exchange rate 
fluctuations, and that is why the appropriate 
exchange rate regime is maintained by the 
central authority – this is how Croatia appears.
In any case, the assumptions remain as they 
were defined for hypothesis H2 in subchapter 
3.2, i.e. ‘The more the exchange rate is set by 
the market (min = currency board; max = free 
floating), the smaller the share of EUR or USD.’ 
and ‘The more the exchange rate is set by 
the market (min = currency board; max = free 
floating), the greater the share of the national 
currency (NC).’
Based on the correlation analysis, 
a statistically significant relationship was found 
at α = 5% in the case of the pair ‘exchange 
rate arrangement’ and ‘EUR share in imports’ 
(Pearson correl. = −0.827; p-value = 0.006), as 
well as of the pair ‘exchange rate arrangement’ 
and ‘EUR share in exports’ (Pearson 
correl. = −0.696; p-value = 0.037) and finally 
of the pair ‘exchange rate arrangement’ and 
‘NC share in imports’ (Pearson correl. = 0.680; 
p-value = 0.044). In these three variants, the 
zero hypothesis H2 is therefore rejected and 
the alternative hypothesis is accepted. That is, 
there is a statistically significant relationship 
between the two analyzed variables. In other 
words, the less the exchange rate is given by 
the market (the more it is fixed), the greater the 
share of EUR in invoicing of imports/exports 
and vice versa (the correlation coefficient is 
negative). In the case of imports invoiced in 
NC, the assumption is also confirmed, i.e. 
the more the exchange rate is determined 
on the market, the higher the share of NC in 
invoicing (the correlation coefficient is positive). 
Conversely, in the case of exports invoiced in 
NC, the zero hypothesis H2 cannot be rejected 
(Pearson correl. = 0.463; p-value = 0.210), i.e. 
the dependence has not been proven by the 
test. Finally, there was found no statistically 
significant relationship between the exchange 
rate arrangement and the share of imports or 
exports invoiced in USD. This result should 
have been actually supposed to be because the 
exchange rate arrangement of the non-EMU 
countries concerned is set in relation to EUR, 
not USD.
At the same time, the results provide 
some information about the inverse position 
of NC and EUR (if one increases, the other 
decreases) and about the vague position of 
US dollar invoicing. Therefore, a separate 
EUR-NC test was performed. The results of 
the correlation analysis confirm a statistically 
significant inverse relationship for both imports 
(Pearson correl. = −0.898; p-value = 0.001 for 
the year 2018 and Pearson correl. = −0.925; 
p-value = 0.000 for the year 2014) and exports 
(Pearson correl. = −0.847; p-value = 0.004 for 
the year 2018 and Pearson correl. = −0.753; 
p-value = 0.019 for the year 2014). A similar 
statistically significant relationship between 
EUR and USD or between NC and USD was 
not identified by the test.
4.3 Trends in Average Shares  
of Invoicing Currencies
Based on the data from Tab. 2 the figure below 
(Fig. 3) graphically presents the averages of the 
euro, US dollar, and NC shares on invoicing of 
non-EMU countries in individual years. Imports 
and exports are divided. This is a similar output 
as Fig. 1, only in this case data are presented 
only for non-EMU countries.
Fig. 3 shows the following: First, regarding 
imports, in the period under review, the share of 
USD is falling steadily (USD 2010–2018 = −6.1 
p.p.; if we fit the values over time with a straight 
line, it would have a slope of −2.13, R2  = 0.64). 
On the other hand, the share of EUR has been 
growing steadily (+8 p.p.; if we fit the values over 
time with a straight line, it would have a slope of 
+2.38, R2 = 0.90) and the share of NC has fallen 
only slightly (−2.2 p.p.; slope −0.42, R2 = 0.31). 
Share of other currencies – not shown in Fig. 3 
– is practically stable. Similar to the figures for 
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the EU as a whole (see Fig. 1), the US dollar 
dominates. Even in this case, there can be 
expected significant influence of oil and natural 
gas, which are traditionally traded in USD. As 
for exports, the euro is already prevailing over 
the US dollar, with a slight fluctuation in 2012. 
In terms of trends, the share of the euro only 
slightly increases (EUR 2010–2018 = +4.3 p.p.; 
slope +1.3, R2 = 0.73), and the USD share is 
practically stable. NCs decrease more markedly 
and steadily (−6.1 p.p.; slope −1.41, R2 = 0.96). 
Other currencies got slightly (not captured in 
the graph).
In summary, for both import and export 
there can be said that especially the euro tend 
to have a stronger position in the given period. 
The US dollar and national currencies rather 
tend to lose their position. Thus, the above-
stated research question has been answered.
5. Discussion
Corporations involved in international trade 
strive to minimize exchange rate risk. One 
way to reduce risk is to choose an invoicing 
currency. And this article was focused on the 
choice of the invoicing currency as a possible 
manifestation of euroization.
However, the manifestations of euroization 
also take other forms – see, e.g., Ivanov et al. 
(2011). These authors paid their attention to 
the bank deposits and loans in the Croatian 
economy and the possible causes of changes 
in their amount. In contrast to this contribution, 
on the one hand, they follow an overlap into all 
parts of the economy, on the other hand, they 
are focused only on Croatia. Moreover, Croatia 
has traditionally been a very euroized country 
because of the historically low quality of the 
local currency, the Croatian kuna. Therefore, 
the variables affecting euroization, which 
Ivanov et al. (2011) follow, are, say, traditional – 
i.e. exchange rate, exchange rate volatility, real 
effective exchange rate and inflation. But since 
the research presented here contains a sample 
of economies with differently ‘good’ currencies, 
the effort was to find other relationships (GDP 
volume, exchange rate arrangement).
Fig. 3: The average share of euro, US dollar, and NC in imports (upper part)  and exports (lower part) of non-EMU countries in 2010–2018
Source: own
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Concerning a similarly focused research, 
Lighart and Werner (2012) observe practically 
similar conclusions on the case of Norway as 
this paper offers. The euro is pushing itself as 
an invoicing currency at the expense of the 
Norwegian kroner (NOK) and also occupies 
a position of vehicle currency instead of the 
US dollar. Comparison with the conclusions of 
Lighart and Werner is also beneficial due to the 
quality of the NOK, which does not suffer from 
historical symptoms (high inflation) such as the 
aforementioned Croatian kuna or the Polish 
zloty. Low inflation is mentioned by Lighart and 
Werner as an explanatory variable of the effect 
on the euroization of invoicing in Norway.
However, whatever approach to research 
is chosen, the conclusions on euroization or 
de-euroization always aim at the quality of 
the economic policies pursued, i.e. to a stable 
macroeconomic environment (Bošnjak, 2018; 
Ivanov et al., 2011). Therefore, following 
Tab. 1, it seems no coincidence that the 
population of countries with a traditionally 
good macroeconomic environment (de facto 
good currency), such as Sweden and the 
Czech Republic, do not have much support 
for replacing their national currency with the 
euro. Greater willingness to euroization can 
thus still be expected mainly in those economic 
areas where the use of the euro is not only 
economically reasonable but also comfortable. 
And such an area may be international trade 
with intensive ties to euro-paying countries. 
However, or perhaps therefore, as Friberg and 
Wilander (2008, p. 68) mention in their findings, 
Swedish exporters most often used the local 
currency – the Swedish krona – at the time of 
the data collection for the 2006 survey (At that 
time, the euro as a currency had a fairly short 
history and moreover, traditional countries such 
as Norway, Denmark, the UK, the USA, China 
are traditional important trading partners. That 
is, countries that do not have the euro as their 
legal tender.). And although according to Tab. 2 
the share of the national currency in Swedish 
exports (as well as imports) clearly decreased, 
this decline was not in favor of the euro, but 
rather in favor of other national currencies and 
USD.
Conclusions
According to available Eurostat data on import 
and export and invoicing currency of non-EMU 
states to third countries expressed in EUR, 
USD, national and other currencies, it was found 
that the block of EU countries not yet using the 
euro as their sole legal tender rather euroizes in 
terms of international trade invoicing.
The level of growth in the share of the euro 
and the decline in the national currency has 
a different intensity for imports and another for 
exports. At the same time, it was found that for 
imports in EUR and NC and exports in EUR, 
a statistically significant correlation between the 
currency of the invoicing and the exchange rate 
regime could be identified. Last but not least, it 
has been found that for invoicing in EUR and 
NC, there is a relationship between the size of 
GDP and the currency of invoicing. In the case 
of EUR, the relationship is indirect – the smaller 
the economy, the greater the euro’s share of 
invoicing and vice versa. The progress of the 
relationship is best captured by the exponential 
function. In the case of NC, this relationship is 
direct – the smaller the economy, the smaller 
the share of NC and vice versa. In this case, 
the progress of the relationship is best captured 
by the logarithmic function. No statistically 
significant model was identified for US dollar 
invoicing in relation to the size of the economy.
The above-mentioned shows that, 
especially in smaller economies, the ability 
and will of (domestic) companies to push 
through the national currency as invoicing is 
limited. At the same time, the position of Poland 
can be emphasized. Although Poland is not 
a small economy in terms of GDP, the ability 
or willingness of Polish firms to invoice in the 
Polish zloty is rather low. The invoicing of Polish 
international trade will also be undoubtedly 
influenced by hysteresis; i.e. the behavior of the 
dynamic system is influenced not only by the 
current variables, but also by the initial situation 
– in the case of Poland, historically high inflation 
during the period of economic transformation.
This research neglects some of the potential 
drivers of both corporate euroization and de-
euroization. At the macro level, for example, 
it may be the development of the terms of 
trade between EUR and NC (exchange rate 
development), or other economic indicators 
traditionally mentioned in relation to the OCA 
theory, i.e. the inflation rate or interest rates. 
At the micro-level, it may be for example the 
ability to transfer exchange rate risk to another 
entity, or the very attitude of business owners 
or business management to the euro as such. 
These effects may therefore be subject to 
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further study. At the microeconomic level, the 
challenge is to obtain information similar to the 
one analyzed in this article, but this time for 
intra-EU trade, or information on trade and its 
settlement in EUR directly within a particular 
national economy.
Finally, the information gathered in the 
research presented here can be used by 
policymakers whether to argue for more 
euroization or de-euroization, for businesses 
and their future approach to exchange rate risk 
management and for example for banks and 
other financial institutions that offer currency 
hedging and conversion.
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